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John Dewey was born in 1859, the year that saw the publication-celebrated
worldwide this 150th anniversary-of Charles Darwin's The Origin of Species.
I value the opportunity to address you today under the distinguished auspices of
Dewey, though it is Darwin, I shall argue, who is the better guide when we try
to think about the place of religion in a society that aspires to be fair and
sustainable. The question whether such a society would include the free
exercise of religion among its constitutional guarantees has recently become
a focus of debate amongst legal philosophers. The philosophy of law-the
frame for this series of endowed lectures-is in some ways the most humble,
low-level of philosophy's branches. But that same lowliness entails that one
cannot do legal philosophy well without investigating and taking positions in
all the higher levels and domains of practical philosophy, not to mention the
epistemology and metaphysics which practical philosophy partly presupposes
and partly informs. So legal philosophy is like law and lawyering: a place
where all the great questions come to a head and become truly practical-a
place proximate to decisions and actions affecting real persons and their lives
and fortunes, decisions and actions whose rational soundness will depend on
access-through culture, insight, or philosophy-to the deepest principles of
morality and most strategic truths about human beings and their environment.
So: a privileged place to work in.
In the debate I mentioned, some contemporary American legal and
constitutional theorists hold that there is nothing about religion or its free
exercise that calls for particular respect, or any mention in constitutional bills
of rights. That is the thesis which my lecture concerns. Religion, these
theorists hold, has no such dignity, though (they add) history's testimony to
the vulnerability of religions or their adherents, especially their vulnerability
to oppression by other faiths, helps explain and in a weak sense justify the
First Amendment's denial of Congressional power to make law either
"respecting an establishment of religion" or "prohibiting the free thereof."
Ronald Dworkin is a principal proponent of the thesis,2 but its most energetic
1. This paper was first delivered as the annual John Dewey Lecture at the University of
Minnesota Law School in March 2009.
2. Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006),
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exponents over the past fifteen years have been Christopher Eisgruber and
Lawrence Sager, whose joint work culminates in their book Religious
Freedom and the Constitution. The book argues for a principle they call
"Equal Liberty," a principle which is demanded by fairness in religiously
diverse societies and which "denies that religion is a ... category of human
experience that demands special benefits and/or necessitates special
restrictions,"4 or any "special immunity for religiously motivated conduct."5
In Eisgruber and Sager's theory or principle of the "Equal Liberty" there
is much that may seem welcome. They argue strenuously against the
metaphor of "separation of Church and State," and their theory equally
discredits not only that slogan but also the once prevailing Supreme Court
interpretation of "no establishment of religion" that forbad any state aid to
religious or religiously affiliated enterprises. They offer to defend, not a
secularism that would reject, exclude or disparage religion, but what they see
as the healthy secularity of non-religious institutions-say, secular public
schools-which while declining to be (and prohibited from being) "overtly or
specifically religious," "aspire to constitute a practical realm in which various
competing ... philosophical and religious views may coexist and constructively
interact."7 They have no time for Rawlsian proposals to expel from the public
domain all religious arguments or grounds for decision-making;8 they share,
I think, Dworkin's (and Joseph Raz's) healthy scepticism about that
ramshackle Rawlsian proj ect-he calls it "political liberalism"-which in all
really important decisions about human rights and the common good would
banish concern for truth and in its place put an imaginary overlapping
consensus of the "reasonable" views of all "reasonable" people (views
supposedly identifiable as reasonable without reflection on their truth). They
hold-rightly, I think-that in these matters neutrality is not an option. As to
free exercise of religion, Eisgruber and Sager support the approach in
Employment Division v. Smith,9 the Peyote case, upholding "neutral and
generally applicable" laws even when they happen to restrict some religious
practice and no "compelling state interest" required them to do so. That
134; Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 60-62.
3. Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager, Religious Freedom and the Constitution




7. Ibid., 216 (emphasis added).
8. See ibid., 48-50 (not explicitly mentioning Rawls's "political liberalism")
9. 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990), Scalia, J. for the Court.
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approach is much less welcome to many who recognize the particular good of
religion and religious liberty, but when I revisit it later in this lecture I will not
be arguing against it. Yet for all this, the over-arching theory of Equal Liberty
proposed by Eisgruber and Sager is, I think, radically unsound, at the very
least insofar as it denies to religion and religious liberty any moral or
constitutional status distinct from other "deep commitments."
Their theory's first exposition was entitled "The Vulnerability of
Consciences: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct."'
But the title can give a mistaken impression of their central thesis. For they
deny that conscience as the rational faculty of practical judgment has any more
claim than religion to constitutional privilege or even protection." Rather,
the proper object of constitutional protection is any "deep concern," any and
all "deeply" motivated and self-shaping attitudes and behavior. Whether or
not these are religious or even conscientious, all alike are entitled to "equal
regard." There is, they say, a "grand diversity of relationships, affiliations,
activities, and passions that share a constitutional presumption of legitimacy"
because in them members of "a modern, pluralistic society... find their
identities, shape their values, and live the most valuable moments of their
lives."' 2  Religious acts, they concede, have the same dignity and
constitutional status as the "relationships, affiliations, activities and passions"
under discussion. Their article did not say how far this wider category
extends, and their book, too, is not much concerned to clarify the matter. But
it does make clear that, in their view, the freedom of a religious association
such as the Catholic Church to maintain a male priesthood is defensible only
as an instance of the constitutional principle that "there are a variety of
personal relationships in which members of our political community are free
to choose their partners [as in Lawrence v. Texas], associates or colleagues
without interference from the state."' 3 And their 1994 article had several
times explicated the phrase "deep concern(s)" (which in the book is usually
rendered "deep commitment(s)") as including "passionate" acts and
relationships. '"
10. University of Chicago Law Review 61 (1994): 1245-1315.
11. Ibid., 1263, 1268-70.
12. Ibid., 1266. In truth, identities are shaped, not merely found, and values are found (or
imagined) not merely shaped.
13. Religious Freedom and the Constitution, 65; Lawrence v Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003),
involving partnership in casual homosexual sodomy, is cited on the preceding page.
14. "The Vulnerability of Consciences," 1283. At the very outset (1245n), the authors say
that "an important theme of this essay is that religion does not exhaust the commitments and
passions that move human beings in deep and valuable ways."
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Eisgruber and Sager are right to hold that religion, if it is (as they think)just
one among the deep passions and commitments that move people, does not
deserve constitutional mention on account of any special dignity or value.
True, this hypothesis does not warrant their conclusion that mention of
religion in constitutions is defensible-if at all-only because religious people
(the authors always seem to assume religious majorities) have been so beastly
to each other (they assume, to minority religions) so often that historical
constitution-makers could reasonably treat the exercise of religion as needing
protection just because specially vulnerable to religiously motivated
discrimination. For the argument forgets the threat to religious practice that
can come from atheist or other secularist hostility to religion. But much more
important is the hypothesis itself: that religion is just one deep and passionate
commitment amongst others. This is lethal to religion, and I want to try to
show why.
Before setting out my positive argumentation, I think it is fair to remark that
theirs is a thoroughly external view. 5 They treat religion in the way that
Ronald Dworkin regularly treats views of legislators or "majorities" with
which he is unsympathetic, that is, not as propositions about rights or common
good, or as any other proposition or premise arguably justifying a normative
conclusion, but instead as mere expressions of distaste or disapproval,
accompanied by an appeal to the power of those who hold these views-their
power as a majority to give effect to their attitude, their passionate
commitment.16 Eisgruber and Sager fall into this Dworkinian sort of sophism
in their book's last pages, where they reductively treat the concern of
religiously minded people that America acknowledge its dependence on God
as a mere concern for "their [own] wellbeing," a mere complaint that "they
[the religiously minded] are being deprived of an environment" that they
value. 7 The externality of Eisgruber and Sager's view of religion-their
treating religious propositions as propositions inherently incapable of
conveying any understanding of, or rational response to, any feature of reality,
15. In Religious Freedom & the Constitution, 103, they explicitly speak from, or on behalf
of, "an external, secular perspective."
16. I first pointed to this sophistic technique of Dworkin in "A Bill of Rights for Britain?"
Proceedings of the British Academy 52 (1986): 303-331 at 309-311, and again, with reference
to its pernicious echoes in recent Supreme Court doctrine, in "Universality, Personal and Social
Identity, and Law," (Third) Congresso Sul-Americano de Filosofia do Direito and (Sixth)
Col6quio Sul-Americano de Realismo Juridico, Porto Alegre, Brazil, 4 Oct 2007
(http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid = 1094277). See also Finnis, "H.L.A. Hart:
A Twentieth-Century Oxford Political Philosopher, American Journal of Jurisprudence 54
(2009): 161-85 text at nn.55-57.
17. Religious Freedom and the Constitution, 284-5.
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and their failure even to contemplate a line of rational inquiry, reflection and
judgment such as might lead people to affirm the existence of a transcendent
intelligent and provident creator-is an externality further manifested in their
repeated remarks about "intelligent design." For in these remarks they go
beyond the rational (albeit not wholly compelling) objection that gaps in
experimental science call for more experimental science to two additional
claims: (1) that the "suggestion" that there exists an intelligent designer is
merely "a vague kind of religious view," that is to say a mere "hypothesis
grounded in religion"; and (2) that any identification of the designer as God
rather than gods, wizards, fairies, or "transcendental pasta" (their scornful
phrase), is a mere profession of religious faith. 8 Assessing these two claims
will get us closer-indeed close-to the root of this lecture's title question.
II
Is the "suggestion" that there exists a transcendent intelligent designer a
"hypothesis grounded in religion"? At the age of 65, seventeen years after the
publication of The Origin of Species and six years before his death, Darwin
wrote an Autobiography, which he revisited occasionally to supplement. It
was a little too candid, intellectually, for some in his family; so the
posthumous first publication of it in 1882 was not quite complete; but the
deletions were eventually restored. In a short paragraph, present in his first
draft and never revised, he speaks of a "source of conviction in the existence
of God," a source which is "connected with the reason and not with the
feelings" and therefore "impresses me [him] as having much more weight"
than another source that he had mentioned, namely, "the sense of sublimity,"
or more exactly the sort of "higher feelings of wonder, admiration and
devotion" that, as he had years before recorded in his journal, filled and
elevated his mind whilst standing in the midst of the grandeur of a Brazilian
forest. By now, in 1876, even "the grandest scenes would not cause any such
convictions and feelings to rise in my [his] mind." But when he sets feelings
and lack of feelings to one side, and attends instead to reason, that is to
thinking about data and their explanation, then once again there arises a
''conviction in the existence of God" which
follows from the extreme difficulty or rather impossibility of conceiving this
immense and wonderful universe, including man with his capacity of looking far
backwards and far into futurity, as the result ofblind chance or necessity. When
thus reflecting I feel compelled to look to a First Cause having an intelligent
18. Ibid., 190, 281, 310 at n. 56.
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mind in some degree analogous to that of man; and I deserve to be called a
Theist.' 9
Now it is clear that Darwin, when he wrote this, had for some years had no
religious faith, no religion, no desire to adjust his living and thinking, in any
way, to respond in any way to the intelligent mind of any supposed First
Cause. Doubts about whether the human mind can be trusted when "it draws
such grand conclusions," and about whether the felt, or rather adjudged,
necessity of "the connection between cause and effect" instead "depends
merely on inherited experience," had reinforced the source of doubt that
earlier led him to abandon Christian faith, namely, the suffering and death of
his own daughter and, beyond that, the spectacle of all the suffering and waste
in the world of nature. So he concludes: "The mystery of the beginning of all
things is insoluble by us; and I for one must be content to remain an
Agnostic."
The structure and sequence of Darwin's inner debate-as traced in this
autobiographical reflection on the cause of the world and of its evolution-are
philosophically sounder than the debate's conclusion. His foundational
judgment (when really thinking, not feeling) was: it is impossible rationally
to ascribe the universe to chance or "blind necessity," and necessary to ascribe
it instead to an intelligence which is neither a part of nor the totality of the
universe but nonetheless the universe's cause. That foundational judgment is
reasonable, sound and indeed inevitable, provided we correctly understand his
phrase "impossible to conceive," and that phrase's implicit counterpart or
entailment "necessary [compelled to conceive]" and, for that matter, my term
"inevitable." Correctly understanding these key terms requires more precision
than, I think, Darwin himself achieved. The impossibility in question is not
the impossibility of the logically contradictory or incoherent, and the implicit
necessity is not logical necessity or strict entailment. Nor is it a matter of
''psychological necessity," or again of that necessity-of-habit which Darwin,
an avid amateur of David Hume, perhaps has in mind when he speaks of
"inherited experience;" and equally it would be gratuitous to appeal here, in
a Kantian manner, to a "structure" of the human mind. The necessity is,
rather, the rational necessity of adhering to those norms of rational enquiry
19. The Autobiography of Charles Darwin 1809-1882: with original omissions restored,
ed. Nora Barlow (London: Collins, 1958), 92 (emphasis added). Some time after writing this,
Darwin inserted, immediately after this passage: "This conclusion was strong in my mind about
the time, as far as I can remember, when I wrote the Origin of Species; and it is since that time
that it has very gradually with many fluctuations become weaker."
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and judgment which articulate what experience of discovering reality shows
is needed for overcoming ignorance, illusion, and error.20
Such norms guide all scientific inquiry, all scientific discovery and all
scientific achievements and applications-and are the source, equally, of all
enquiry, discovery and judgment in fields which lie wholly or partly beyond
the methods of natural science, fields such as mathematics, logic, philosophy,
history, and the interpretation of texts and conversations. In all these fields,
truth is found and knowledge of reality is won by hypothesizing (and then,
when evidence and argument fail to disconfirm it, appropriately concluding
to) some explanation, some explanatory factor or state of affairs or
reality-what Darwin reasonably calls some cause-in preference to mere
chance or inexplicable ("blind") necessity. So, one of the many rationality
norms is: an adequate explanatory reason why something is so rather than
otherwise is to be expected, unless one has a reason not to expect such an
explanatory reason. Chance, of course, there is aplenty in a world where
events and processes, each of which has its own intelligible explanation(s),
coincide. But science progresses constantly by treating chance as the
residuum of coincidence in a domain dominated by what is explicable because
it is not by chance. (So Richard Dawkins's celebration, earlier this
anniversary year, of Darwin and Darwinism ends by indignantly repudiating
the thought that evolution proceeds or has ever proceeded by chance!)2'
Absolutely no entity, process or other state of affairs in the world we can in
any way experience or know shows any sign of necessarily-or, for that
matter, causelessly-being what it is; or any sign of either necessarily or
causelessly being actual rather than non-existent, or necessarily or causelessly
doing what it does or changing as it does. Postulating that the whole (the
universe or cosmos or universe of universes) has existed for an infinite
time-a postulate that philosophers like Moses Maimonides and Thomas
Aquinas are happy, indeed keen, to entertain 22-- does not make it reasonable
to predicate of the whole either a necessity or a causelessness that is
discoverable in none of its component entities or state of affairs. Far more
reasonable is it to infer that the actuality and intelligibility of every entity,
process or state of affairs result from a sui generis reality which has what it
takes both to exist-be actual-without being caused and to cause,
intelligently, absolutely every such resultant ("created") entity, process and
20. See Finnis, NaturalLaw andNaturalRights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) [NLNR],
68-9, 385.
21. Richard Dawkins, "Darwin, the Truth," Times Literary Supplement, February 4, 2009.
22. See Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory (Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press, 1998), 301, citing Summa Theologiae, I q. 46, a. 2; Summa contra
Gentiles, II c. 38 n. 8; and three other texts.
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state of affairs. 3 (Nor is it difficult to show that no set of gods, no wizard or
fairy, and no transcendental pasta, could have what it takes to be sheer
actuality, without trace of mere potentiality, the pure actuality needed to
explain a universe in constant development from potentiality to actuality.)
If one does what Darwin, it seems, did not sufficiently do, and takes fully
into account (i) the wholly sui generis character of this transcendent actuality
and causality of everything else, and (ii) the accordingly quite sui generis
character of what he like Aquinas called the analogy between the Creator's
and our creaturely minds, then one will discern the proper response to the
doubts which in Darwin's mind somehow seemed to make possible what he
had rationally judged impossible, namely conceiving of this world as existing
without an intelligent First-or better, transcendent, sui generis--Cause. For
beyond (or behind) the doubt which arbitrarily reduced the rational demand
for an explanation to mere habit, and the doubt which a priori declared
untrustworthy the only available explanation, there lay the doubt-which is
not arbitrary or a priori-that a transcendent intelligence would not have
chosen to make this world with its apparent "waste" and its all too real not
apparent suffering. The proper response to this doubt looks to the very
consideration which Darwin treated as ground for abdicating from the whole
enquiry and for accepting, agnostically, the equal possibility of what he had
already judged impossible-the non-existence of an intelligent and
transcendent cause. What consideration was that? Darwin put it in various
similes and metaphors, all acknowledging or asserting the inadequacy of our
grasp of the relevant realities and possibilities involved in conceiving of a
transcendent and ultimate explanation of everything (including, of course, of
the domains of mathematics and logic, or knowledge of the past, of intending
and understanding intentions, and of mind's effortless though not
unconditioned mastery over matter, as in speaking, or pointing). As I summed
up Aquinas's fundamental response to the "problem of evil":
Straining to ascribe everything to chance rather than a creative intelligence,
materialists object that in some respects the pattern and evolution of things is
wasteful, pointless, badly ordered, unintelligent. They do not attend to the fact
that much which seems to them pointless or wasteful is still somehow a
describable and to that extent stable and intelligible pattern. And in judging it
23. Anthony Flew, There is a God: How the world's most notorious atheist changed his
mind (New York: Harper, 2007), 74-158, surveys the state of the debate, with particular focus
on argumentation (e.g., of scientists like Einstein, Heisenberg, Planck and others) analogous to
Darwin's, argumentation whose strictly philosophical respectability Flew briefly vindicates. For
a more fundamental treatment of philosophical issues about the existence of God, see Germain
Grisez, God? Philosophical Preface to Faith (South Bend, IN: St Augustine's Press, 2004),
cited under the first edition's title in NLNR, ch. xiii.
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defective or unintelligent because they do not understand its point, they resemble
a country bumpkin (rusticus; idiota; ignorans) who, from the true premise that
he does not understand what is going on in a busy laboratory or hospital theatre,
draws the conclusion that what is going on is random, unintelligible, pointless,
or foolish, or perhaps just needlessly complex.24 The intention of an intelligence
capable of projecting and actualising the entire cosmos and all its interlocking
orders vast and miniscule (including human minds with all their capacities to
understand and reason logically, mathematically, and interpretatively) is not an
intention we could ever reasonably hope to understand-fully by reasoning from
those truths about it which, in our fruitful but laborious inferences from
experience, we do manage to understand.25
Or again, as I concluded a discussion of evil and creation in my Natural Law
and Natural Rights,
The norms in terms of which we judge states of affairs to be evil, in any of the
four orders [of human knowledge: nature, logic, morality and technologies], are
not applicable to D [the transcendent first cause] as creator. Thus we have no
ground to judge that D's creative causality is defective. 6
Let me pause to take stock. I asked: Is the "suggestion" that there exists an
intelligent designer a "hypothesis grounded in religion"? The example of
Darwin shows well enough why it is not. The lines of thought that converge
on the conclusion that one should affirm a transcendent cause are lines of
thought continuous with all our enquiries, reflections and judgments in every
field of science and rational discourse. They are philosophical, though in
substance accessible to informal "common-sense" reflection. They are the
perennial root and cause, rather than a consequence, of religious belief.
Indeed, in themselves they are not yet religious at all. Before we can speak of
religion, we must add further affirmations, including at least one further
philosophical affirmation, and also some affirmations within practical
philosophy (ethics) and some response(s) of freely willing relating of oneself
to the divine. These points merit some expansion.
24. See Aquinas, Collationes Credo in Deum 1; Summa contra Gentiles I c. 3 n. 4;
Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi [Sent.] I d. 39 q. 2 a. 2 ad 5; De Veritate
q. 5 a. 5 ad 6; also Summa Theologiae I q. 116 a. Ic and Summa contra Gentiles III c. 92 n. 12
[2678] (gravediggers who are not aware of their director's purpose of finding buried treasure
in the graveyard). The flourishing of evildoers and the miseries of decent people in this world
(see I Sent. d. 39 q. 2 a. 2 obj. 5; Expositio super lob prol.) are in accordance with the abyss of
the incomprehensible judgments of God {secundum altitudinem incomprehensibilium iudicium
Dei}: Quaestiones de Quodlibet III q. 3 a. 3c; also I Sent. d. 39 q. 2 a. 2 ad 5.
25. Finnis, Aquinas, 304.
26. NLNR, 391.
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I
The philosophical character of the arguments for and affirmation of God's
existence is strongly suggested by the philosophical lengths to which thinkers
tend to go who make it their business to reject that argumentation and
affirmation. David Hume denies the reality of human insight and equally the
reality of natural causation, trying in vain to replace the one with habitual
conjunctions of images (misnamed by him "ideas") and the other with mere
correlation or repeated coincidence. Richard Dawkins's disproof of God, in
his The GodDelusion,27 uncritically assumes, explicitly, that complex realities
can only be caused by more complex realities-implicitly, that mind is no
more than complexified matter-an assumption falsified by every move one
makes, in thought, to clarify one's statements and avoid fallacious arguments,
and indeed by every meaning-conveying word we utter, and every project one
brings to fruition. John Dewey made even wider and higher the protective
rampart against enquiries that reach out for ultimate explanations; he rejected
as superseded the "notion" that "knowledge is a disclosure of reality, of reality
prior to and independent of knowing" and the "notion" that "knowing is
independent of a purpose to control the quality of experienced objects. 28 The
latter position of his was an instrumentalist pragmatism (significantly coarse
compared with the philosophy articulated by pragmatism's founder Charles
Peirce) which harmonized with Dewey's denial, in his legal philosophy, that
there are any principles which are more than "working hypotheses, needing
to be constantly tested by the way in which they work out in application to
concrete situations"--a denial which rendered merely provisional, indeed
unintelligible, various unalienable human rights which have had to be insisted
upon in the aftermath of Nazism and the like.29 And Darwin like any other
serious scientist could scarcely have assented either to Dewey's denial that
knowledge discloses reality or his assertion that knowledge is all for the sake
of controlling experience-positions each of which cuts off both the sense of
wonder that is the motor of science and blocks the search for a knowledge of
the past (not least the past of evolution).
27. Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (London: Bantam Books, 2006).
28. John Dewey, The Questfor Certainty: A Study of the Relation ofKnowledge andAction
(New York: Minton, Balch, 1929), 43-4.
29. The impact of Dewey's position can be measured by Posner's statement in Law,
Pragmatism, and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003): "Not.. .that
the judge has a duty to abide by constitutional or statutory text, or by precedent. That would




But now it is time to make the other point: the judgment that God exists as
explanation or causal source of everything's actuality, existence and
intelligibility is no mere contemplation of the past. It includes or at least
entails ajudgment (indeed several judgments) about the relation between our
own thought and action and the ongoing causal activity of the transcendent
creator, the activity traditionally called divine providence. For first, since
every entity, process or state of affairs somehow caused by the transcendent
source is contingent, not necessary, it is reasonable to think of divine
causation as not only intelligent but also free-as if it were causing through
free choice: to create something rather than nothing, and this totality rather
than other possible universes. And secondly, it is clear to us that our own
activity, including our own thinking things through, is dependent, for its
happening and achieving anything at all, on the cooperation of providence.
Both these inferences are still philosophical-thoughts we have no need or
sufficient reason to call religious. We start to move into the zone of the
religious only with a third line of thought about the relation between our
activity and divine providence.
And that is this. The world we find and do not make includes not only the
normativity or directiveness of logic, but also the normativity of basic
practical principles such as those that pick out knowledge and truth as an
intelligible good to be preferred to ignorance and muddle, or again pick out
harmony with other persons as another such good, to be preferred to hatred
and war; and so forth. For both these reasons, it is reasonable to think of the
creator-the transcendent, intelligent and freely choosing source of reality and
meaning, and of intelligible goods and our directedness towards them--as
being somehow personal, and as personally, so to speak, anticipating human
fulfilment and leading us, via our own understanding, deliberation and free
choices, towards such possible fulfilment." To have thought so far,
something which takes time to spell out as I have but which common sense
grasps as quick as thought, is to have reached the very threshold of a new,
equally effortless, but now fully practical insight: that it would be good to be
responsive to and-in hope, because in awe of one's finiteness and
dependence-cooperative with this transcendent personal source of whatever
good we any of us could achieve. That is the good whose pursuit is religion
and its exercise.
30. Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle and John Finnis, "Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and
Ultimate Ends," American Journal of Jurisprudence 32 (1987): 99-151 at 279-80. Nor is this
line of thought foreign to pre-Christian philosophy, as is demonstrated by Plato's reflections on
the moral and political importance of(acknowledging clearly) divine concern for human life and
choices: see Finnis, "On the Practical Meaning of Secularism," Notre Dame Law Review 73
(1998): 491-515.
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To be more precise, it is, so far forth, the good of natural religion, of an
understanding of providence, dependence, and co-operation which does not
yet include (though it would reasonably be open to) the belief, the faith, that
it has been informed by some inter-personal communication, private or public,
from-some revelation of-the transcendent and divine." It is an
understanding that understands itself still to be from end to end a series of
rational inferences from experience, natural science, and philosophical
reflection. This remains so, even when the interpretation of divine
providence's governing of events is adventurously confident, as for instance
in a passage near the beginning of the very first presidential inaugural address,
exactly 220 years ago next month. (You should have in your mind's eye the
President, not as the stiff, florid figure of later portraits, but as the intense, far-
seeing man sculpted two years earlier, with admiration and genius, from a life-
mask, by a fellow freemason, Jean-Antoine Houdon, who took the better
version back with him to France.) Having begun by recounting the anxious
process of deliberation and discernment by which he decided to accept his
country's summons out of longed-for retirement, Washington observes that-
it would be peculiarly improper to omit in this first official Act my fervent
supplications to that Almighty Being who rules over the Universe, who presides
in the Councils ofNations, and whose providential aids can supply every human
defect, that his benediction may consecrate to the liberties and happiness of the
People of the United States a Government instituted by themselves for these
essential purposes: and may enable every instrument [official or other public
servant] employed in its administration to execute with success the functions
allotted to his charge. In tendering this homage to the Great Author of every
public and private good I assure myself that it expresses your sentiments not less
than my own; nor those of my fellow-citizens at large less than either. No People
can be bound to acknowledge and adore the invisible hand which conducts the
Affairs of men more than the People of the United States. Every step, by which
they have advanced to the character of an independent nation seems to have been
distinguished by some token of providential agency.32
31. On the importance of natural religion, and the idea of natural religion, in the thought
of the founders of the American republic, see Gerard V. Bradley, Religious Liberty in the
American Republic (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2008), 8-9, 29,40-41,46 and 1-46
passim. The report of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary on petitions to abolish the
office of chaplain, 21 January 1853, lucidly affirms that"our fathers.. .did not intend to send our
armies and navies forth to do battle for the country without any national recognition of that God
on whom success or failure depends..."
32. The Papers of George Washington, ed. W.W. Abbot et al., Presidential Series, vol. 2,
ed. Dorothy Twohig (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1987), 174.
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Those steps, you all recall, included for Major General Washington and his
forces many defeats, retreats, disasters, along with many and eventually
decisive victories, and then the peace settlements, confederation and the
making and adopting of the Constitution itself.
The natural, philosophical religion invoked by President Washington is
articulated with maximum economy in the prayer (the Regents' prayer) that
in 1962 was expelled from the public schools of New York by the Supreme
Court in Engel v Vitale33: "Almighty God we acknowledge our dependence
upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and
our Country." Such is the core both of natural religion, and of any
paradigmatic form of religion that goes beyond philosophy and natural
religion to elaborate a doctrine and worship informed or mandated by some
kind of non-philosophical communication from or with the divine reality-a
form of religion such as one finds richly elaborated in, say, Judaism or
Orthodox or Catholic Christianity. (There are, of course, non-paradigmatic
instances of religion, some of them historically highly significant such as
Buddhism, in which the relation between the transcendent and the world is
differently conceived.) The human good of religion is centrally the good of
being aligned in one's intelligence, will, and freedom with the intelligence,
will, and freedom of the Creator; notions such as fall, repentance, forgiveness,
redemption all fall within the ambit of that generic alignment, that assimilatio
and adhaesio, as Aquinas puts it, an alignment that even natural religion can
at least envisage and esteem even when, like Aristotle, it responsibly judges
that the divine is too transcendent for us to hope for a relationship such as
friendship.34 One does not get the measure of even merely natural religion's
dignity and value if one remains with the conception of religion's value that
Andrew Koppelman has proposed on the basis, not least, of the "place-holder"
sketch of a good of religion that I offered in chapter IV of Natural Law and
Natural Rights.35 Koppelman's intentions in this enterprise are good - he is
a critic of Eisgruber and Sager's unadmitted secularism---but the content and
dignity of the good of religion cannot be identified (as he attempts to identify
them) with a mere human questing, considered without regard to the reasons
that point both to the existence of God as proper and real object of such
questing, and to something of the divine nature and activity.
Nor should we neglect the importance of natural religion's underpinning of
the idea, the truth, of human equality, the equality of the one species of animal
33. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
34. Nicomachean Ethics VIII.7: 1158b35, 1159a4; see NLNR, 397.
35. See Andrew Koppelman, "Secular Purpose," Virginia Law Review 88 (2002): 87 at
130-31; "Is it Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?" University of Illinois Law Review
(2006): 571-603 at 593-4.
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whose members, each and all unlike (as far as we can tell) all other animals,
have the radical capacities of persons. Those capacities are to participate in
the immaterial life of the spirit, the life of meanings, logic, truths and errors
(known by their consistency with evidence and principle, not by their
correlation with any brain-state), about the past, the actual, and the possible.
As one of the sub-clauses36 in the Indian Constitution's clause on religious
liberty reminds us, it is possible for a developed religion to distort natural
religion's awareness of human equality under the supreme, creative spiritual
reality. But a deeper threat to human equality is materialist, scientistic denials
of spirit, denials which strip away the one aspect of human reality that makes
us equals in dignity despite the manifold inequalities between us. It seems
significant that those who expend the patrimony of a religious, anti-materialist
civilization, the patrimony we call rights, by extending rights to sub-personal
animals, are characteristically to be found denying the equal rights of young
or disabled human persons. Prayer like the New York Regents' prayer,
acknowledging to God our dependence and addressing to the unseen God, by
thought, a petition, both presupposes and reinforces the anti-materialist truth
so essential to the validation of human rights.
IV
Eisgruber and Sager admit that the rule in Engel v. Vitale, expelling all such
prayer from public schools even when opting-out is fully permitted and
protected, cannot be adequately justified by simple appeal to the risk of
coercion by social pressure. That sort of argument, they concede, certainly
could not justify such progeny of Engel as Santa Fe Independent School
District v. Doe37 : after all, anyone can stay away from a football game at
which there will be school-sponsored prayer. They accept that these judicial
prohibitions, picking out the exercise of religion for seemingly "unique
prohibitions that have no secular analogues,"" seem on their face
incompatible with Equal Liberty. But Eisgruber and Sager vigorously defend
the absoluteness of the rule in these cases. They do so by appealing to a wide-
ranging principle of disparagement:
Government-sponsored prayer rituals involve a public embrace of the
faithful.. .more precisely, of those whose faiths are consistent with mainstream
36. Art 25(2)(b): "[The state may make law] providing for social welfare and reform or the
throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections
of Hindus."
37. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
38. Religious Freedom and the Constitution, 161.
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public prayer. As a result, their social meaning includes this blunt message: The
real members of this community (the school community and by extension the
larger community serviced by the school or school district) are practicing
Christians of a certain sort; others dwell among us but lack the status of full
membership. The public rituals create a class of outsiders and thereby
disparage those relegated to that status.... Proponents... will no doubt object
that neither they nor school authorities have any intention to disparage anybody;
their goal is simply to make prayer rituals available to those who will appreciate
them .... [But] the relevant question is not about the intentions of particular
speakers, nor about the perceptions of particular audiences, but rather about the
social meanings of rituals, practices, and religions.39
You are entitled to be puzzled by a "meaning" which floats free both of the
intentions of the speaker or acting person and of the perceptions of the
audience. But this argument from unintended but supposedly real
disparagement is now a mighty force in constitutional and political arguments
against not only religion or religions but also against the institution of
marriage, the primacy of our language within our own country, and every
other aspect of our culture which is not universally shared and about which
some people, whether or not part of our community by birth, are discontented.
To require immigrants to speak our language, argues Joseph Raz, is to
disrespect them, to express a judgment that their culture is inferior and to be
eliminated.4" Here Raz, for so many years a stem critic of Ronald Dworkin,
implicitly throws in his lot with Dworkin's long-running sequence of
arguments, each one springing up when its predecessor twin or cousin was
refuted, all revolving around the claim that some state action manifests
disrespect, or lack of equal respect, for those persons whose conduct it
restricts or otherwise affects-restricts or affects perhaps, in truth, out of
lively concern to protect them from their own folly or weakness.
To all these attributions of disrespect, insult, or disparagement, unhinged
from any intent, we should reply that they are gratuitous and groundless,
essentially sophistic fictions. The meaning of the resolve to pray together is
simply not that those who abstain or absent themselves are not full members
of the community. They are full members of the community, with every
single right that everyone else in it enjoys, and every single right enjoyed by
those who engage in the corporate activity from which they are entitled to
dissent, and with whom they have, pace Eisgruber and Sager, equal
39. Ibid., 163-4 (bold type added).
40. Joseph Raz, "Multiculturalism," Ratio Juris 11 (1998): 193-205 at 200, referring also
to Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 178. On
all this see my "Universality, Personal and Social Identity, and Law," part III.
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constitutional stature.4' Similarly, those countries or legislatures or citizens
who insist that immigrants learn the country's language, lest a Balkanized
country be bad for all alike, need neither have nor convey any view that the
immigrant culture is inferior, or any intent to eliminate or in any way
disparage it. And in those cases where they dojudge some cultural syndrome
inferior, and hope or even plan for its elimination, their judgment need be no
more unfairly disrespectful of persons than the judgment that sexual relations
between grown men and ten-year old girls are immoral, harmful, and, however
revered the men who have indulged in them, are (like female genital
mutilation) to be eliminated from our community.
V
Time to take stock again. I have assembled the main premises for a primary
answer to my title-question. Religion deserves constitutional mention, not
because it is a passionate or deep commitment, but because it is the practical
expression of, or response to, truths about human society, about the persons
who are a political community's members, and about the world in which any
such community must take its place and find its ways and means. Even the
many seriously misguided religions tell in some respects more truth about the
constitution's ultimate natural (transcendent, supra-natural) foundations than
any atheism or robust agnosticism can.
This thesis is consistent with the kind of argument I develop in all chapters
save the last in my Natural Law and Natural Rights and Fundamentals of
Ethics-the argument that practical reason's first principles can be understood
and acknowledged, and their normative implications extensively unfolded into
rich, substantive moral, political and legal theory, without relying upon,
presupposing, or even adverting to, the existence of God or providential order.
But: if it is true, as I argue in the final chapter of each of those books, and of
my Aquinas book, and have outlined again today, that the rationality norms
which guide us in all our fruitful thinking also, and integrally, summon us to
affirm the existence and providence of God, then we should expect that
refusals to make such an affirmation will rest on arguments, or to other
considerations, which do not leave reason, including practical reason, intact
and undistorted. I have already alluded to this matter in my remarks about
Hume, Dawkins, and Dewey. And those reflections can be taken a little
further.
41. Cf. Religious Freedom and the Constitution, 130, where the authors gratuitously
postulate that a (hypothetical?) "mainstream Christian" majority consciously treat dissenters as
"less than full members of our community" who lack "equal constitutional stature."
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The first condition for the acceptability of a philosophical position is that
it be coherent not only with itself but also with the worth of critically
reflecting on it, proposing it, arguing for it, and communicating it discursively
to others. So, for example, positions about legal obligation must not only
satisfy the test which H.L.A. Hart showed 2 is failed by Holmesian Legal
Realism, namely that it make real sense of the use of rules by judges, officials
and other rule-followers-a use in which rules function not as predictions but
rather as guides, directives, norms. Positions about legal obligation must also
make sense of the willingness of such judges and others to treat positive legal
rules in this way, in deliberations where at the time for decision the rules must
either compete or cohere with the standing reasons for action that are supplied
by moral requirements and other intelligible needs. Hart, as Nicola Lacey's
biography shows, was tormented by what he knew to be the failure of his own
legal philosophy to satisfy that condition.43 Blocking his way to a satisfactory
account was his deep uncertainty about the status, as reasons, of moral and
other deep practical principles and reasons for action; he could not see how
they could be true-really reasons-without being somehow "part of the
furniture of the universe," a metaphor he rightly regarded as discrediting what
it purported to signify. And indeed the only ultimately satisfactory account
of practical truth is one that first points to first practical principles such as I
have exemplified by the principles directing us respectively to the good of
truth and the good of friendship-and secondly understands these as
principles that we do not select, fashion or invent, and that have their truth by
anticipating the human fulfilment whose realization is possible through
actions in conformity with these (and other like) principles; and that thirdly
observes that though this anticipatory correspondence to fulfilment is different
from the correspondence of true propositions to reality in non-practical
knowledge, the two kinds of truth are nonetheless analogous since in both
cases there is a correspondence of the human mind, and its objects, with the
divine creative mind." That account of practical truth, though it is not free
from mystery or challenge to the imagination, is coherent and sufficiently
intelligible, and with it in place, we can range up and down the whole reach
of practical thought, making good sense of the authority and obligatoriness of
positive law and its "social fact sources." We can escape the fate of all those
narrow legal positivisms shipwrecked by their aspiration to explain the legal
"Ought" (which they rightly conceive as a kind of reason for action) by
42. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 1, 10-11.
43. Nicola Lacey,A Life ofH.L.A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream (Oxford and
New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 335-6.
44. See Grisez, Boyle, and Finnis, "Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends,"
115-20; Finnis, Aquinas, 99-100.
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deriving it from some "Is"-a form of explanation which Plato and Aristotle
discerned was fallacious long before Hume did, and far more steadily than
Hume ever did.
Similarly, legal philosophy's account of agency and responsibility in
contract formation, tort and criminal law must cohere with the facts of human
freedom and responsibility to rational normativity which are instantiated,
precisely as facts both experienced and at least partly understood, in one's
critical questioning, reflecting and reasonably judging in this or any other area
of philosophy. For philosophizing is an activity, and carrying it forward is
subject at every moment to our freedom to back off, opt out, cheat, or
persevere in fidelity to norms of rationality (attention to evidence, relevant
questions, and argument, and so forth). And the mystery of this freedom of
choice, so scandalous to materialists, is alleviated by two reflections: (1) that
divine causality must be such that it could explain not only the causality that
natural science seeks out and recounts but also those orders of
reality--evidenced, like the order or reality studied by natural sciences, in
every deliberate human act-orders whose intelligibility is not the object of
natural sciences at all, the orders of logic, of practical reasoning towards
choice and self-shaping action, and of mind's mastery over matter in
technologies from speaking and ballet-dancing to moon-shots; and (2) that the
creator's choice to bring about this universe rather than none or some other
had a freedom which is surely the archetype of any choice of ours that is truly
free.
Nietzsche's famous account of guilt and punishment, and conscience, in his
On the Genealogy of Morals (1887)-a prime inspiration of today's post-
modernisms-is a paradigm of the havoc wrought in a train of thought, a
course of thinking, which is in some sense philosophical but truncated and
turned against itself by (as Nietzsche is well aware) that refusal of natural
theology which he gives the absurd but sinister name "the death of God."
Suffice it to recall the last part of the Genealogy, in which he declares that
willingness to seek and hold on to truth is itself a product of that sickness we
call conscience. The truths that conscience is a sickness and that God, the
only ground of truth's value, is nonexistent therefore put in question, render
problematic, the will to truth, and the value of truth and being truthful: "the
value of truth must for once, by way of experiment, be called into question."
Nietzsche's phrase "by way of experiment" reveals the ultimately frivolous
character of his thought,45 and the depth of the impasse to which his arbitrary
45. We do not have to decide about Nietzsche's character, or about what truth maybe found
in his work. Eric Voegelin, "Nietzsche, the Crisis and the War," Journal of Politics 6 (1944):
177-212, 185-6 presents him as a teller of truth about Europe's cultural suicide; elsewhere
Voegelin shows him as a paradigm of the destruction wrought by atheism and the nihilism that
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assertions and denials have driven him. But he does not deny, indeed he here,
at this juncture, admits that the "core" of conscience is, in fact, the will to
truth and truthfulness. As he says, again, the "hard, severe, abstemious, heroic
spirits ... these pale atheists, anti-Christians, immoralists, nihilists ... these
men are far fromfree spirits:for they still believe in the truth!" And right here
Nietzsche associates himself with the secretum of the highest grades of "that
invincible order of the Assassins, that order of free spirits par excellence," (a
sect of Shi'ite Muslims in Syria, Lebanon and northern Persia, whose
operative killers called themselvesfedayeen)--the secretum being, according
to Nietzsche, that "nothing is true, everything is permitted." He calls this a
"proposition" (true? false?) with "labyrinthine consequences" that will be
worked out in "the great drama in a hundred acts which is reserved for Europe
over the next two thousand years."46
In all this we have, of course, left reason and responsibility far behind, and
are witnessing the performance of a kind of atheistical magician, a
performance rationally inferior, by far, to the paradigms of religious thought.
One of the evidences of its real impact in legal theoretical writings of recent
years was Judge Posner's 1998 lectures at Harvard on law and morality.47 On
the wider stage of the world, of course, such performances as Nietzsche's,
such essays in decapitating reality by willfully refusing to admit reasonable
questions and to pursue the self-critical, collaborative, discursive search for
real causes wherever it leads, have had drastically real consequences. Eric
Voegelin traced in detail48 the point at which the young Marx, some years
before Nietzsche, issued to himself (as if to the world too) his decree against
raising questions about ultimate origins, and gave himself over to the fantasy
of self-creation which is at the root of his notion of revolutionary
transformation of human nature and society, a notion for which so many paid
so high a price with so little good fruit of any kind.
In short, decapitation of reality is dangerous to individuals and societies.
Religion in principle repudiates what sound philosophy confirms is indeed
such a decapitation. Treating religion as a private concern with the same
public status as casual private sex insinuates a serious public untruth about the
is its rationally consistent accompaniment.
46. For citations and some further material, see Finnis, "Retribution: Punishment's
Formative Aim," American Journal of Jurisprudence 44 (1999): 91-103, 92-94, esp. n. 17.
47. "The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory," Harvard. Law Review 111 (1998):
1637 (see the opening quotation).
48. "Science, Politics, and Gnosticism" [1958], in The Collected Works ofEric Voegelin,
vol. 5, Modernity Without Restraint, ed. Manfred Henningsen (Columbia, MO: University of
Missouri Press, 2000), 262-5, 268-71, 274, 279-80, 284-6
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reality in which political communities and their law have their place.49 The
political community's public duty to respect, that is, to leave uncoerced, the
conscientious religious beliefs and acts of everyone, even beliefs that include
much that is false and acts that are accordingly ill-justified, is a duty grounded
in a serious moral (not legal) duty of each individual-one's duty: to seek the
truth about reality's most fundamental shape and, having raised and pursued
that question, to shape one's life in line with what one judges one has
discovered about such matters, a duty which is only fulfilled if it is pursued
with an authenticity that would be prejudiced, corrupted and even nullified by
coercion and psychological pressure.5"
VI
Before I conclude with a secondary reason or pair of reasons for giving free
exercise of religion constitutional protection, I should say something on the
appropriate form and measure of that protection. Forbidding or invalidating
the prohibition of free exercise of religion is probably not as satisfactory as
declaring a right such as that articulated in Art. 25 of the Constitution of the
Republic of India, brought into effect in January 1950 after more than two
years of lucid and intelligent public debate in a constitutional convention:
Right to Freedom of Religion
25. (1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions
of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the
right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion.
49. This damaging insinuation is analogous to (though significantly distinct from) the
damaging insinuation (teaching) portrayed by J. Budziszewski, What We Can't Not Know
(Dallas: Spence, 2004), 162: "A good many parents decline to give their children any religious
instruction, saying that they think it is better to "let them make up their own minds." But
declining to teach [religion] is itself a way of teaching ... a very definite creed with eight articles:
(1) It is not important for children to know anything about God. (2) The questions which
children naturally ask about Him require no answers. (3) Parents know nothing about Him worth
passing on. (4) To think about Him adequately, no preparation is needed. (5) What adults think
about Him makes no difference. (6) By implication, He does not make any difference either;
God is not to be treated as God. (7) If anything is to be treated as God, it will have to be
something other than Him. (8) This is the true creed, and all other creeds are false.... [A person
thus] raised to "make up his own mind" ... [will have] the habit of not taking important things
seriously, and the habit of considering the way things really are as less important than what he
thinks of them at the moment."
50. That is the fundamental argument in Second Vatican Council, Declaration on Religious
Liberty, 1965 (Dignitatis Humanae).
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Later in the same year, the European Convention on Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms articulated:
Article 9 - Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone
or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
The European formulation has some advantages. It suggests one of the
reasons why it is appropriate not to be content with declaring a right to
freedom of thought and conscience. Much more clearly than "thought" and
"conscience," the term "religion" connotes activities which extend from the
individual to the associative and social, and from the private to the public,
even when the Indian Constitution's reference to propagation is omitted. The
European formulation also makes explicit the freedom to change one's
religion, something which you here in Minnesota know is of increasing
importance; and the Second Vatican Council's articulation of the freedom5
makes helpfully explicit that, morally if not constitutionally, the right is to be
"immune from coercion whether by individuals or social groups and by every
kind of human power.
' '52
51. This is essentially a right to be free from coercion when one is exercising one's
conscience in forming, holding or giving effect in action to one's beliefs "in matters religious"
(in re religiosa). This freedom from coercion was often described by the drafting committee
as an immunity. And though it is not an immunity in the sense stipulated by Hohfeld in his
analysis ofjural relations, there is no objection to using "immunity" as a synonym for a claim-
right not to be interfered with or coerced. The "religious liberty" is nothing more, nor less, than
a claim-right not to be coerced inperforming religious acts, individual or corporate within due
limits.
It follows that the fundamental topic of Dignitatis Humanae is in substance not a liberty-
right (stricto sensu) but duty-the duty of state government and law, and of other groups and
individuals in civil society, not to coerce anyone's religious acts unless they threaten the rights
of others, public peace, or public morality. The right of religious liberty-freedom from
coercion-that is the subject-matter of DH is nothing other the correlative of that duty, i.e., it
is nothing other than that duty considered from the point of view of the beneficiary of (the
performance of) that duty. For analysis of the Declaration and its drafters' intentions on this
issue, see Finnis, "Religion and State: Some Main Issues and Sources," American Journal of
Jurisprudence 51 (2006): 107-30 at 120-22.
52. Dignitatis Humanae 2: "This Vatican Council declares that human persons have the
right to religious freedom. This kind of freedom consists in this: that all human beings ought
to be immune from coercion whether by individuals or social groups and by every kind of
human power, so that in religious matters no-one is compelled to act against his or her
conscience or impeded from acting according to his or her conscience, whether acting publicly
or privately, alone or in association with others, within due limits." The Latin is: "Haec
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The modem constitutional and ecclesiastical documents all try to specify
the boundaries of the right or freedom. The European Convention, for
example, says (Art. 25(2)) the "Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs
shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the
protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights
and freedoms of others."53  In practice, despite the use here of the
Convention's stock phrase "necessary in a democratic society," this principle
of limitation works much more like Employment Division v. Smith than like
the earlier U.S. principle in Sherbert v. Verner (1963),"4 which permitted
limitations on free exercise of religion only when required by some
compelling state interest. So we can ask about both Smith and Art. 25(2): Do
they give sufficient constitutional protection? Obviously, much could be said,
and I will skip to the bottom line. There can be problems that are not really
about boundaries but about abuses, moral errors by legislators or judges that
can scarcely be protected against by sound constitutional provisions. The
application of general and (in intent) religiously neutral laws against
discrimination can be unjust and a grave imposition on religious or religiously
organized and inspired enterprises. Such is the case with laws prohibiting
discrimination against persons who make no secret of their engaging in same-
sex sex acts but wish to be employed as teachers in Catholic or Evangelical
schools or to make use of Catholic or Evangelical facilities such as adoption
Vaticana Synodus declarat personam humanam ins habere ad libertatem religiosam. Huiusmodi
libertas in eo consistit, quod omnes homines debent immunes esse a coercitione ex parte sive
singulorum sive coetuum socialium et cuiusvis potestatis humanae, et ita quidem ut in re
religiosa neque aliquis cogatur ad agendum contra suam conscientiam neque impediatur,
quominus iuxta suam conscientiam agat privatim et publice, vel solus vel aliis consociatus, intra
debitos limites." The scandalously inadequate translation currently on the Vatican website
reads: "This Vatican Council declares that the human person has a right to religious freedom.
This freedom means that no one is to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his own beliefs,
whether privately or publicly, whether alone or in association with others, within due limits."
53. The Indian limiting provision is built into the text of art. 25(1), and is amplified by art.
25(2): "(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the
State from making any law-(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or
other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice; (b) providing for social
welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to
all classes and sections of Hindus."
Dignitatis Humanae 7 says the right can be made subject to legal limitations arising out
of "the need for an effective safeguard of the rights of all citizens and for the peaceful settlement
of conflicts of rights, also out of the need for an adequate care of genuine public peace, which
comes about when people live together in good order and in true justice, and finally out of the
need for a proper guardianship of public morality."
54. 374 U.S. 398.
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agencies, church halls, and so forth. The mentality which regards same-sex
marriage as conceivable, let alone desirable or reasonable, involves a truly
radical break with human experience and reason. The consequent unjust
impositions on religious or religiously motivated activities and associations
are probably best resisted by pointing, not to religious liberty, but to the way
these impositions infringe associational freedom and parental rights, while
pointing in any case to their manifold wrong-headedness about sex and
marriage, to their abuses of children's innocence, and to their recklessness
about the common good and the nation's future. In short, I am rather
disinclined to protest, as Congress has, against the principle in Smith; its
requirement that any law limiting free exercise be neutral, given vivid effect
in the Santeria animal sacrifice case," should give religion the constitutional
protection it deserves and in some eras may need.
VII
Two secondary, rather pragmatic reasons to judge religion deserving of
constitutional protection come into view when we raise a final question. What
if a religion rejects on principle the right to religious freedom as defined, for
example, in the ECHR's reference to freedom to change one's religion, and
rejects also other fundamental elements of our constitutional order? After all,
it's only five or six years since the eighteen judges of the European Court of
Human Rights held unanimously, in Refah Partisi (No.2) v Turkey, that:
...the Court considers that sharia, which faithfully reflects the dogmas anddivine
rules laid down by religion, is stable and invariable. Principles such as
pluralism in the political sphere or the constant evolution of public freedoms
have no place in it.... a regime based on sharia ... clearly diverges from
Convention values, particularly with regard to its criminal law and criminal
procedure, its rules on the legal status of women and the way it intervenes in all
spheres of private and public life in accordance with religious precepts. .[A]
political party whose actions seem to be aimed at introducing sharia ... can
hardly be regarded as an association complying with the democratic ideal that
underlies the whole of the Convention. 6
On that basis the ECtHR upheld the Turkish Supreme Court's dissolution of
Turkey's elected Government and of the country's main party, on the grounds
55. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v City offHialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
56. Refah Partisi (No. 2) v. Turkey 37 European Human Rights Reports 1 (2003), at sec.
123 (emphasis added), Grand Chamber, upholding and adopting the language of the Third
Section of the ECtHR in Refah Partisi (No. 1) v Turkey 35 European Human Rights Reports 3
(2002).
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that the Government in which that party was dominant was, or might well be,
preparing to introduce sharia either as law applicable to all or as part of a
scheme in which every citizen would be subjected to the law of his or her own
religion respectively.
Contemporary American constitutionalists are deeply suspicious of this sort
of "militant democracy"-pre-emptive defense of democracy--even when
practiced, as here, by a court (initially the supreme court in Turkey) They will
tend to find it even more questionable when it asks you to focus steadily on
the possibility that a particular religion-the private faith of fellow citizens or
of hard-up immigrants-might be different from all other religions in its core
beliefs about the Constitution, and about the legitimacy of long-term deception
and intimidation in the cause of overthrowing it or, much more immediately,
in the cause of rendering certain constitutional guarantees, and related moral
rights, inapplicable within the religion's zone of dominance. For I should not
conceal the fact that it was part of Turkey's case before the ECtHR that "In
order to attain its ultimate goal of replacing the existing legal order with
sharia, political Islam use[s] the method known as "takiyye", which consist[s]
in hiding its beliefs until it ha[s] attained that goal." The Court did not make
any explicit finding about Islamic takiyye (a practice which had not, it seems,
been denied by the applicant members of the dissolved government and party),
but it did observe more broadly that political parties and movements may
conceal their aims and profess their adherence to democracy and the rule of
law until it is too late to prevent them overthrowing both.57 Still, for present
purposes we do not really need to speculate about the possible secret
intentions of particular members of the Islamic religion. We can study the
open public documents and declarations of states publicly holding themselves
out, and cooperating with each other, precisely as Islamic states, such as the
Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, adopted by the governments of
45 states in August 199058 as superior to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948. This
1990 Islamic Declaration's article on religious freedom reads as follows:
"(10) Islam is the religion of true unspoiled nature. It is prohibited to exercise
any form of pressure on man or to exploit his poverty or ignorance in order to
force him to change his religion to another religion or to atheism." That's all.
But articles 24 and 25 add, for good measure: "(24) All the rights and
freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are subject to the Islamic Shari'ah.
57. Refah (No. 1) at secs. 48 and 80; Refah (No.2), at sec. 101.
58. U.N. GAOR, World Conference on Human Rights., 4th Sess., Agenda Item 5, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 157/PC/62/Add. 18 (1993). The declaration is by the Organization of the Islamic
Conference, to which now (2009) belong 57 states; approval of the document was by the organ
of the Conference which meets annually, the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers.
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(25) The Islamic Shari'ah is the only source of reference for the explanation
or clarification of any of the articles of this Declaration."
These realities put a question-mark over more than one part of the
orthodoxy of American free exercise doctrine. They raise a doubt about the
part that says the law and the Court must make no investigation of a religion's
doctrines, and over the part, treated as axiomatic by justices of every shade of
opinion, that forbids any discrimination between religions. What if the
"theological propositions of a religion" include political teachings "wholly at
odds with premises of our liberal democracy" or, to speak like the ECtHR,
"with the democratic ideal that underlies the whole of the [Constitution]" or,
to speak I think more suitably, with the Constitution and other principles that
we have taken as foundational for our law? Is it unconstitutional to
discriminate between religions at the borders? Would doing so amount to a
wrongful disparagement of adherents of the religion who are already citizens?
Would it wrongfully impinge upon their free exercise of religion? Or violate
the human right to religious liberty of those who would be kept out of the
country in the interests of the nation's public order?
In thinking about the last question, we come across one of the secondary
reasons for constitutionally acknowledging religious liberty: that that
guarantee fittingly accompanies the appropriate principle of distinction
between religion and state, the principle which the Constitution witnesses to,
perhaps, by its exclusion of religious tests and prohibition of Congressional
establishment of religion.59  The distinction is, of course, of wide and
fundamental importance. It is theme enough for another lecture. The only
implication of it that I wish to touch on is its relevance to thinking about
control of immigration. In that precise connection we can see it at work in one
of the present Pope's first statements:
Single believers are called to open their arms and their hearts to every person,
from whatever nation they come, allowing the Authorities responsible for public
life to enforce the relevant laws held to be appropriate for a healthy co-
existence.'
59. The principle appears in another way in the second reason given byDignitatisHumanae
for religious liberty: " "The religious acts whereby men, in private and in public and out of a
sense of personal conviction, direct their lives to God transcend by their very nature the order
of terrestrial and temporal affairs. Government therefore ought indeed to take account of the
religious life of the citizenry and show it favor, since the function of government is to make
provision for the common welfare. However, it would clearly transgress the limits set to its
power, were it to presume to command or inhibit acts that are religious factus religiosos
dirigere vel impedire]." (DH 3, emphasis added)
60. Benedict XVI, Address to the Pontifical Council for Pastoral Care of Migrants and
Itinerant People, 15 May 2006: http://www.vatican.vaiholyfather/benedictxvi/speeches/
2009
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF JURISPRUDENCE Vol. 54
Within a universal religious community such as the Pope's there is no
distinction between citizen and foreigner. But, as his words make plain, it
does not follow that such a distinction may not have decisive relevance to the
common good, and indeed the public order, of political communities.
So a nation state, if not this one, any time soon, then one or more of the
European states more immediately affected, might judge it reasonable to limit
or forbid further immigration by persons unwilling to credibly renounce their
religion's core theologico-political and numbers-dependent drive to impose
political and legal domination.6 But then-and here is the other secondary
reason I want to mention for constitutionally guaranteeing free exercise-it
would be all the more important, you may agree, firmly to protect the right-a
qualified right, of course62 --of citizens to practice that religion (as well as the
right, repudiated by their religion's law or doctrine, to renounce it).
2006/may/documents/hf ben-xvi spe_20060515_pc-migrants-en.html. Nothing in the
particularly vague paragraph on international migration in the encyclical Caritas in Veritate (29
June 2009), sec. 62, qualifies this.
61. Because numbers-critical masses-matter, times change. A legislature looking
forward from now, or fairly soon, might responsibly decide that the only likely medium-term
constructive alternative to forbidding immigration by persons unwilling to make that
renunciation will foreseeably prove to be the state-promoted introduction-as is beginning to
be ventured in France, Germany and the UK-of an emasculated version of that highly
distinctive religion, supervised by state instrumentalities responsible for selecting its teachers
and preachers in the hope of watering down its inbuilt focus on domination, violence and
submission, its division of the world into the world of submission and the world of war, its
public and private subjection of women, and other features that (so the legislature might judge)
make it at best inassimilable and at worst a clear and mounting danger to the public good. If
the latter alternative (a State-sponsored form of that religion) is to be judged permanently
unavailable here, because a plain "establishment of religion," still the resort to it by centrist
European governments may go some way towards (a) showing a compelling state interest in not
treating that religion and its followers in just the same way as others, and thus (b) surmounting
the bar raised by the beguiling but curious doctrine of the Supreme Court that discrimination
against one religion is not only unfair but also an establishment of all the others (and of
irreligion?).
62. See n. 53 above.
